Subjects: Fundamentals of Israeli Security

This is the Time to Act in the U.S.

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Begin describes the American spirit as crushed, defeated, and powerless after a visit in April 1975. He attributes this to the war in Vietnam and America’s feeling of shame that comes with the inability to combat communism. Begin reveals that he was always skeptical of the Paris agreements, and to believe they would be effective in containing communism and preventing war would be cynical or naive. He argues that the spread of communism is just as much a blow to Israel as it is to all other nations. On American television, he explained to the public that the situations in the Middle East and South-East Asia are not comparable. Begin tells Americans that the Arab minority “enjoys cultural autonomy and the option to accept citizenship.” He ends by stating that it would be an unwise choice for Kissinger to advise Ford to not supply Israel with arms. That would be a decision that would cause outrage amongst both Israelis and Americans.

Jerusalem is Not Phnom-Penh

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Begin very clearly outlines the goals of Israel as: “peace treaty, declaration on the establishment of peaceful relations, ceasefire, armistice, non-belligerence, and a state of war and its annulment.” Begin accuses Dr. Kissinger of trying to deprive Israel of what it needs, a peace treaty. He says that without a peace treaty, there can be no transference of territory, except, according to Kissinger, in Israel. Likud urges the Prime Minister to not retreat until Egypt has annulated the state of war, meaning no withdrawal from the land without a peace treaty. He says that if Israel were to comply with Egypt’s demands and retreat, Israel would be in the same position as the war-torn Vietnamese city Phnom-Penh, “within the range of the enemy’s guns.” Even America, he says, cannot help alleviate the situation there because of the gunfire of the Khmer Rouge forces. He says, “They are what our enemies wish for us,” as he urges the public to stand tall, not to retreat, and defend Israel.

No, Dr. Kissinger!

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Begin emphasizes the importance of not retreating to the 1967 borders. Israel was offered an end to belligerency in exchange for the retreat, however Begin is unimpressed. To explain the situation in a way that is more understandable for an American audience, he compares it to the hypothetical situation America would find itself in if Russia offered eternal peace if they allowed them to occupy Washington and destroy the US nuclear stockpile and missiles. Begin finds Dr. Kissinger’s plan reminiscent of the Rogers Plan, which he rejected. He describes Dr. Kissinger’s plan as a “step-by-step approach to the plan of our total disintegration.” He argues that this disintegration of Israel will also have negative effects on America because it is possible that the Arabs will force the US to exert pressure on Israel, and if they do and Israel surrenders as a result, “there will be no bounds to Arab blackmail, which will be supported by Russia.”

Israel is Strong Enough to Resist Dr. K’s War of Nerves

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Before Dr. Kissinger’s visit to the Middle East to propose a final plan for peace, Begin reviews the threats he feels Dr. Kissinger has used against Israel in an attempt for force them to surrender territory. Sadat demands that Israel withdraw from the Sinai, Golan Heights, and Jordan River, but the state of belligerency will only end if an Arab State is created in the areas of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Dr. Kissinger refers to these demands as moderate. Kissinger stated that if Israel does not retreat and give back territory, war will be inevitable. Begin famously believed the exact opposite of that, that war is never inevitable, and “lessons of the past show how they can be averted.” Begin makes Kissinger out to be a schoolyard bully, trying to force Israel into actions that are not good for the State.

How Dr. K Pulls the Strings

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Begin gives examples of how Dr. Kissinger manipulated the governments of Israel, the United States, and Egypt into having things work out the way he had planned. For example, Rabin proposed a retreat from the Suez Canal if Egypt ends the state of belligerency, and Kissinger immediately declared that Egypt will reject it. Foreign Secretary Allon proposed that Israel retreat another 30-50 km in Sinai if Egypt agrees not to join Syria if they attack Israel, and Israel will no longer demand a public declaration of non-belligerence. Kissinger responded to this with harsh words of disapproval. He claimed it would look to Sadat like Israel was planning to attack Syria, but agreed to bring it to Cairo’s attention anyway. Begin additionally argues that Kissinger told President Ford what to say. In the end, Sadat found Allon’s proposal an insult to Egypt, as Kissinger had predicted.