PM Begin’s Speech at the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations

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4 In nov 1978
Individuals - Anwar Sadat. Security - Army. autonomy plan , Peace - Autonomy Plan, Peace Agreements, Peace Process with Egypt. Democracy , Egpyt , States - Egypt, Jordan, USA. Greater Land of Israel - Golan Heights, Jerusalem, Settlements, Sinai Peninsula. Foreign Policy - Israel-U.S. Relationship, UN. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - Palestinians, PLO. Government - Knesset
At a Speech to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Begin stated that the peace treaty with Egypt precedes all previous agreements between the two countries, and urged sympathy for Sadat's hostile situation within the Arab world. Begin then emphasized the importance of the Israeli people's support for the peace treaty, saying that it will be presented to the Knesset for approval regardless of party discipline. Later, he explained how the US government's peace proposals to King Hussein included departures from the Camp David Accords, in matters such as the legal status of Jerusalem, the IDF presence in Judea and Samaria, the establishment of settlements and the autonomy plan. Finally, Begin noted the sacrifices Israel had made for the sake of peace, including evacuation of settlements and the waiver of the Sinai Peninsula.
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We all congratulated the prime minister some weeks ago at the Americana Hotel. I suppose it is not necessary to do so again, but one new thing has occurred since then. He's now a Nobel Prize winner and I think he's entitled to [unclear, applause 00:30]. May I say that I know the reason we're late and you people have been waiting  and that you people are waiting has to do with important matters of state that the prime minister is involved with. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to introduce the prime minister of Israel.

Thank you, my dear.

[Pause for applause]

Mr. Chairman, my dear friend, ladies and gentlemen, we're all one family and we shall make no introductions. We don't need them. We'll go into media res, immediately into the problems which are on the agenda.

As far as the relations between us and Egypt are concerned, we are coming close to signing a peace treaty. I suppose we reached an agreement on almost all outstanding issues. We wrote a good treaty. Mainly that paragraph which states that that treaty stands on its own feet and takes precedence over other obligations which either side, meaning Egypt, has, because they have treaties with Syria and Jordan and all the Arab states until this very day and therefore we have to say that priorities to this treaty, that is actually the decisive paragraph which we discussed and many weeks on end and now have a very satisfactory formulation of this.

But I must also say something in [unclear 02:27] for ourselves. I can never tell, there may be a last hitch. We know that Boutros Ghali left for Cairo and there may be some proposals from Cairo that several points which were already agreed could be reopened. We are not sure about it. I only speak about such a possibility. Then, of course, the discussion can be prolonged. But we have, of course, two problems which were not resolved yet and the discussion is going on on those two problems. They may have still some problems. Basically, we are close to an agreement. And if there is no last time hitch, well, b'ezrat Hashem, we can sign this peace treaty during the next two weeks, as we said. If it takes some more time, there is no tragedy. Anyhow, The New York Times [unclear 03:28] so…And we didn't find a formula to reopen. 80 days. We only actually negotiated for two weeks. It was 14 days. So I say so because perhaps The New York Times could say, "And where is the peace treaty?" More than 80 days they discussed it. This is the position. And when we reach the conclusion that we can sign the peace treaty, of course, we shall have to bring it to the government for approval, although our constitution does not demand that it be also ratified by our parliament, ratification in Israel is by the government, we will bring it for approval to the Knesset and there will be of course a long debate and, ultimately, the Knesset will take the decision. As we hope it will be a positive one. May I tell you, my dear friends, in complete sincerity, as we always talk to each other, we have problems in the country, about the Camp David agreements and about the negotiations, etc. I also wrote President Carter about it because from time to time you hear one [unclear 04:47]. You should take into consideration the situation of Sadat. He has got rejectionists and other Arab states do not march with him, so he's [unclear 05:09] in the Arab world. So you should understand him and therefore you should be forthcoming. Sometimes, the problems are very serious. There are so-called formulations, but they have contents, and those contents relate to our life and to our future and we say sincerely we can understand the position and we would like to help President Sadat because we want to be with him and live with him in peace and sign a peace treaty and then have an exchange of ambassadors which should take place one month after we withdraw to the line of Ra's Mohammad Al-Arish. In other words, in a matter of a few months there will be, should be, in accordance with that agreement we already reached, an Israeli ambassador in Cairo, an Egyptian ambassador in our country. It will be a new world. Tourism, open borders, etc. Freedom of passage through the Suez Canal for the first time of our own ship using our flag, immediately after the exchange of instruments of ratification. Ratification in Egypt will take probably some two weeks, as the Egyptians told us. They have also to pass an internal law to bring into force an external agreement. So there will be all those very serious changes and we want sincerely not only to sign the peace agreement but to live in peace and in friendship and understanding, mutual help. They need help. We have our own problems. But what I would like to point out is that whenever we hear this argument, please understand the situation of Sadat, we answer, we have to answer, a dual on the standards. What problem has Sadat from other countries? But Iraq is not going to march into Egypt and Syria is not going to attack Cairo. And, to put it very succinctly, President Sadat's regime is a dictatorship and his word is the law. The whole press is completely controlled by the government. All the media. And the army supports him. So he's got external problems with other states, Syria, Iraq, but in his own country, he's the boss, he's the ruler, everything he decides is carried out. In Israel, we don't talk about democracy, we practice it. And, my friends, I may tell you, I have problems. For instance, as I also informed President Carter, as you know, at the time, I fought in the Underground for the liberation of our country and I am together with the men of the Irgun for 34 years, and there has never been a difference of opinion. For the first time in 34 years there is a group of my own best, most beloved friends with whom I have to have a debate. I say philosophically, c'est la vie. Sometimes, in political life, it's unavoidable. But it is painful, very painful. When you have a debate between opponents, it's natural. When you have a debate between friends – and with some of your most beloved friends, whom you still love and respect – then it is very painful. And so it is in the Knesset, so it is outside the Knesset. We have the real problems. I had to make an hour-long speech at the last session of the cabinet in order to really gain support from almost all the cabinet, 15 votes for, two abstained. It was a few votes against and it was an exertion, not only intellectually. I gave you this detail in the beginning in order that you should understand that that argument, we must always look what is happening around Sadat. It is not morally sufficient that we should make sacrifices and perhaps may lose the support of our own people. We cannot. We can have a political arrangement with any Arab country only when we have the support of our own people. And, therefore, I would like to [unclear 10:38] my own tzaras [unclear 10:40]. And so it should be stated at every opportunity, whenever you meet American friends, senator, who brings up this argument, "Take into account Sadat's situation and agree to this or that, etc." This will be the part about our bilateral Egyptian-Israeli relations and you know that the negotiations go on. A liaison from Washington will come next week. Maxwell Ho, he will tomorrow be participating in the session of the cabinet informing our colleagues about developments with maps and all the details, the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, the three zones we have. All in all I can tell you with complete conviction it is a good treaty, it will be good for the future of Israel if we overcome the last hurdles we will sign it in the full recognition that it is a service to Israel. If we overcome those difficulties we still face. However, there are other opinions in the country and, again, we shall leave the vote to the conscience of every member of the Knesset. I will not ask for so-called party discipline, which is usual under a parliamentary regime, and every member will vote for himself. When the Knesset approves of the treaty, then it will be initialed and then signed and there are different proposals where those ceremonies should take place. This is also important. We can leave it out for the sake of saving time. Now, ladies and gentlemen, I will go immediately into the problems we face now with the administration in this country. The replies given to the questions which were put to the American government by King Hussein on television were an absolute surprise to us. We were not consulted. Our director-general of the Foreign Ministry asked for the replies to see them because there is a commitment given by President Ford to my predecessor. It is a commitment on behalf of the United States that they should consult us before bringing proposals, new proposals. And he got a refusal. We didn't get those replies beforehand, we got them post factum, after they were delivered to Hussein, and then when I had a long talk for two hours with Mr. Saunders – who, of course, is an official, an emissary, he fulfilled the duty which was given to him, but the replies themselves were a complete surprise to us and a very unpleasant surprise. And our friends should know the [unclear 14:09]. And therefore I will make to you immediately the analysis I made in the presence of Mr. Saunders and, actually, I repeated it, the main points, in the good conversation we had with Secretary Vance yesterday. Yesterday?

Interviewer: The day before yesterday.

"The United States interprets the phrase 'representatives of the Palestinian people' not in terms of any single group or organization as representing the Palestinian people, but as encompassing those elected or chosen for participation in negotiations. It is expected that they will accept the purposes of the negotiations as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242." This is a deviation from the commitment given to us several years ago. Namely, that there will be no contact between the American government and the so-called PLO unless they recognize the right of Israel to exist. In parentheses I will say that these words are, may I say, not the best chosen. "Right to exist." We expect the PLO to recognize our right to exist as a nation, but that is the document signed and therefore I quote it and then Resolution 242. "And it is a condition." Now, instead of condition, the words are "It is expected that they will accept the purpose." That was not the commitment, "It is expected," it is a clear-cut condition that was deleted.

Aide: Also, "the purposes." It's not "accept the resolution," it's "accept the purposes." Another deviation.

As defined. Not the resolution, but the purposes as defined. I am grateful to you, thank you very much. Now, the second point. "We see the transitional period as essential to build confidence, gain momentum and bring about the changes in attitude that can ensure a final settlement which realizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people while assuring the security of Israel and those Arab parties." You will remember the phrase, "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." We never wanted to sign this phrase because we know the Arab interpretation. They interpret this as a Palestinian state. We wouldn't have signed it or approved it at Camp David, under no circumstances, because of that interpretation. Now, we found a way to solve this problem when we suggested that in the document of Camp David, the word "also" is inserted. And, therefore, the phrase goes, "We recognize also the legitimate rights of" what is called "Palestinian people," we call them "Palestinian Arabs" and I got a letter from President Carter that we interpret every place where there is such an expression as Palestinian Arabs, West Bank, Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District, and that word, "also," was the key to our approval of that phrase. "Also." And when we wrote "also," we didn't mean the rights of the Saudi Arabians or the Iraqis or of the Alaskans. What we meant, of course, and the American delegation understood it very well are Israel's rights and we recognize also the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. And it's true, they have rights. They have rights to live in our country, to freedom, now they have rights to autonomy, as we recognize. They have rights, but also. And that word, "also," is here deleted. And the result is that it's a complete deviation, not only of the words but also of the spirit of the Camp David agreements that Hussein and Sadat and terrorist movements can understand that the agreement is we recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as were used to rights for the last years. And that word, "also," which is so vital – and we explained it to the American delegation on the spot, why we suggested "also," that we have rights and they have rights and we recognize their rights and remind them of our rights – that was deleted, a very serious deviation from the agreement.

"Thirdly, we would have envisaged, therefore, a negotiated solution for the final status of Jerusalem that could be different in character, in some respects, from that of the rest of the West Bank." It is Jerusalem mentioned as such and, as the definition goes, the impression is that Jerusalem is part of what is called the West Bank, whereas Jerusalem is the capital of Israel in toto, united, as everybody knows in the wake of a law promulgated and adopted by our government more than 11 years ago. "The final status of Jerusalem should not be prejudged by the unilateral actions undertaken in Jerusalem since the 1967 war. The United States position on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in his address to the United Nations Assembly and by Ambassador Yost to the Security Council in July 1969." To put it simply, my dear friends, we read the documents, mainly the speech made by Ambassador Yost. It includes the following words: "Eastern Jerusalem is occupied territory and the laws of occupied territories will apply to it, international law will apply to it." And then, as you can see, the unilateral action, so-called, is not recognized. In other words, Eastern Jerusalem is occupied territory, as it is stated in the speech by Ambassador Yost. And the reunification of Jerusalem, as they say in this letter to Hussein and other Arab rulers – because, in the meantime, the letter was sent to other countries – Jerusalem is, here, in the eastern part, occupied territory.

Here I will make a remark in parentheses. The issue of Jerusalem came up at Camp David like this. The American delegation suggested a paragraph in the agreement about Jerusalem which was very well intended and written. We made a certain proposal to amend it. It was adopted. And then we could have agreed upon every word written there. Very characteristically, it started with the following words: "Jerusalem will not be divided." A perfect phrase. And we agreed on it. What happened later? Until the last day Sunday, when I got a draft letter from the president to the effect that I should know that in the opinion of the American government, Jerusalem is occupied territory and the international law relating to occupied territory will apply, etc. That was a draft. It took us completely by surprise. That was Sunday, the last day, the 13th day. And we didn't understand what happened. Until now, we don't have any information. We can only try logically to surmise what really happened. Probably, there was direct or indirect pressure by Saudi Arabia and, therefore, we suddenly, on Sunday around noon, got that letter. Simha talked to Vice President Mondale. Dayan talked to Secretary Vance. I talked to the president himself. All of us said, "It is absolutely unacceptable to us. We have come here to make peace and agreement with Egypt, we didn't come here to divide Jerusalem." Everybody used this phrase. I, for instance, said to the president, "With that letter, we cannot live, Mr. President." And, therefore, they changed, they said, "We will use different language." It is different, although it also includes the letter of, the speech of Mr. Yost, but it is not stated as it was clearly stated in the previous draft. And then, three hours later, we went to Washington to sign the Camp David agreement. Otherwise, we wouldn't have signed. So it could have failed completely. Again, on the issue of Jerusalem. So, after Camp David, with all the knowledge, we have a repetition of this stand in the replies to Hussein.

"Security arrangements after a five-year interim period in the West Bank and Gaza, including the question of the possible retention of Israeli security personnel and the duration of any such presence must be dealt with in the negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza that are to begin no later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period." A most serious deviation from the Camp David agreement and from the agreement which preceded it. My dear friends, in the Camp David agreement, Israeli armed forces stay in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. There will be, as it is written, a withdrawal. Even about that one letter "a" there was a great discussion, for obvious reasons, and then we inserted the letter "a," "a withdrawal," then the remaining forces will be redeployed into security locations because when you say "remaining," it means that it is those forces which remain, that they remain. And in another paragraph, speaking about the security of Israel and its arrangements, it is written, "the transitional period and beyond." And then we had another, at the time, pledge that our forces will stay in Judea and Samaria, not for five years, not even beyond, etc. Much, much longer. May I say, as I said until now, we had such a pledge. Now, suddenly, a complete deviation from what was achieved at Camp David. It will be for the transitional period, and then we have to negotiate what is going to happen after five years with the other side. Whereas, in the Camp David agreement itself, it is clearly stated the security arrangements and, of course, our army is an integral part, an indispensable part of our security. "Beyond." Again, it is a step backwards.

"The United States believes the agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza must meet the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people." My dear friends, on that phrase, we had a discussion for days on end and we didn't agree to the aspirations because, as a young and clever man told me, that may include even the Palestinian Charter as their aspirations and it was agreed that that phrase will be deleted, and it was deleted from all the drafts. You should know that at Camp David we had 23 drafts. It was left out and deleted. And when the time came to give answers to the televised questions of King Hussein, that phrase, which was deleted, reappeared without any justification whatsoever.

Then, "The framework provides that the parties – Israel, Egypt and Jordan, the Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian delegations – will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the civil government authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus the self-governing authority and transitional period is established by an agreement among the three parties. The agreement will define the powers of the self-governing authority and provide full autonomy for the inhabitants. Nothing in the framework excludes the parties from deciding, should they so agree, to give a supervisory or other role to a United Nations or similar neutral, international authority or deciding there should be no supervisory authority." In truthfulness, the last sentence abolishes the first. There can be an agreement that there won't be a supervisory role. But that whole idea of a supervisory role over the administrative council in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip by the United Nations, we hear about it for the first time from this text. It was not even mentioned at Camp David. Suddenly, the possibility that the United Nations will have a supervisory role.

"As stated above, the status of Jerusalem was not resolved at Camp David and must be dealt with subsequent negotiations. The question of how the Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem relate to the self-governing authority remains to be determined in the negotiations on a transitional agreement." Ladies and gentlemen, not one word was mentioned about this at Camp David. Then, it goes on to say that, in those negotiations, the United States will support proposals that would permit Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem who are not Israeli citizens to participate in the elections that constitute the self-governing authority, etc. Never mentioned. The Arabs living in East Jerusalem aren't citizens of Israel because they didn't accept our citizenship. We are prepared to give them citizenship, but they didn't ask for it, they didn't accept it, they vote for the municipality, but Jerusalem is one city and it is the capital city of Israel. Now, the United States government in this reply promises to support the idea that the Arab residents of East Jerusalem will vote for the

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…that none of us will know what is the capital of those countries. What is the name of the capital. Let me say of the great state called Fiji. What is the capital of Fiji? Etc. All the capitals are recognized. 150 countries, members of the United Nations. 150 capitals. All of them are recognized. There is one capital in the world which is not recognized as such, as I heard in Camp David, I took notes, the delegate told me, "The American government does not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel." And I turned to the president and asked him respectfully, "Mr. President, if so, where is the capital of Israel?" And then I had to say, "With all due respect, recognition, non-recognition, Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, culturally, morally, historically, of the Jewish people for the last 3,000 years and so it will be as long as the Jewish people lives." But here, again, in writing, it is occupied territory. And as far as Jordan is concerned, their occupation, cruel occupation, with all the destruction, is called, very beautifully, "administration," and our administration, with freedom to all to come and to pray and to visit every holy shrine, is still called "occupation." It is a moral wrong which is absolutely, in my opinion, humanely intolerable. How long can it go on? It's not 1948, 1949. It is 39 years after our state was created. And again to say that Jerusalem, as such, is not recognized as the capital of our country and that Eastern Jerusalem is occupied territory, suffice if I end my sentence in this way. And they even take into consideration that the Arab inhabitants of Eastern Jerusalem go vote for the autonomy.

"As regards the possibility of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Israel and Syria, the United States will support the application of all the principles of Resolution 242 to such a settlement." That is a clear commitment given by the previous president to the previous prime minister of Israel. Simha knows exactly the text of the matter, but I will quote only the main phrase: "The great weight will be given to the point of view of Israel that it should, in a peace treaty with Syria, be on the Golan Heights, on the Golan Heights." That was the pledge given when the second interim agreement with Egypt was signed. Now, it is not written exactly against, but it means so, or it may mean so.

What about settlements? It is written like this. "Whatever number that might remain beyond the transitional period and the status would presumably agreed in the negotiations concerning the final status." "Whatever number that might remain beyond the five years." That is a clear hint that at least some of them might remain. It was never mentioned at Camp David that the settlements in Judea and Samaria, there is any question about them. Now, what I promised the president, we kept. Namely, that for three months, we shall not establish new settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. We shall add population. And the express words were "several hundred families." This is what we are going to do, as I said to the president. "Several hundred families." But when it came to the conversation between Mr. Saunders and our director-general of the foreign office, Chechanover, because Mr. Saunders said to me, 3 o'clock on Friday, "I will give specific replies to your questions when I speak to Mr. Chechanover," I agreed because I said, because of Shabbat, "I agree that you give specific replies on Sunday to Chechanover." So he said in his replies, we had a copy of them, and he said, "But your phrase means that some of those settlements should be removed," and Saunders said, "It is conceivable." And then there is even a further reply by the ambassador, who told me later that it was not correctly or accurately taken, but Chechanover again told me, so it was taken in the minutes, he said, "Perhaps all of them will be removed, or some of them, or none," speaking [unclear 06:27]. "All of them, some of them, or none." No more and no less.

"A strong local police force will exist and will be responsible to the self-government authority to ensure there will be no interference in the political process that ensures these rights." This strong local police force was created – we agreed to it willingly – to keep order, public order. And suddenly, it is to ensure rights and to ensure no interference in the political process, in the political process. A police force is a political process. Again, a complete deviation, almost unbelievable, from what we agreed.

"In addition, as the political institutions of self-governing take shape," on that we had a long discussion at Camp David. We agreed to the words "self-governing authority" and we put in parentheses "administrative council," which is part of our peace plan. And then it was put in parentheses, the Arabs opposed it first, and it said, "So everywhere it means 'administrative council,' wherever it is written," so is it exactly what we mean to say, "administrative council." We never agreed to the concept of a government, because it is autonomy, not sovereignty. And yet, institutions of self-government. We never agreed to it. It is not written in the Camp David agreement and our ambassador already wrote a special letter, several weeks ago, to the secretary of state to draw his attention because the president used these words in his speech to the Congress that we never agreed to such an expression.

"The United States believes that a resolution of the refugee problem should reflect applicable United Nations resolutions." This is one of the most interesting phenomena in all this story. And the ma'aseh she'haya, kach haya. The suggestion was brought to us that we write in the document, "the appropriate resolutions of the United Nations concerning the refugee problem." We didn't agree, we never agreed, because, first of all, there is the Resolution 11 of 1948, and then there are more resolutions of the General Assembly [unclear 09:22]. They are not binding on us by constitution of the United Nations because resolutions of the General Assembly are only recommendations, we never recognize them, and therefore we didn't want to accept them. What the American delegation convinced us about them was that they use the words "Taking into account those resolutions" – they didn't say these were not actually proper commitments – "Taking into account, why shouldn't you agree to that?" On the other hand, we added the words "refugees," Arab refugees and Jewish refugees, because, since we came into office, we always say that there are Jewish refugees and their problems should be dealt with, exactly as those of the Arab refugees. The president always agreed to that. So it was agreed to write, "Arab refugees and Jewish refugees" and "the appropriate resolutions of the United Nations to be taken into account." That was agreed. Several hours later, there comes an emissary of the American delegation to us and says, "Let us make a deal. We shall delete the words 'Jewish refugees,' although they will always interpret that point as related to both Arab and Jewish refugees, and we shall also delete the whole phrase, 'taking into account the appropriate resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly,'" and we agreed. That was the initiative of the United States delegation. So both parts were deleted. And suddenly, in the replies to Hussein, the words appear, "The United States believe that a resolution of the refugee problem should reflect applicable United Nations resolutions." It was deleted at the initiative of the United States delegation. And yet it reappeared in the replies to King Hussein.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are not all our remarks, but, as I have to go to Los Angeles, I will here stop and tell you that this letter to King Hussein was a complete surprise to us, very unpleasant, and if this should be the policy to be pursued in the future, after we signed the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, then we shall have very great problems, very great problems, and it is my duty to come to my brethren here and forewarn them of the possibility of having such great problems and tell them, also, that if it comes to discussion, then everybody should get up and be counted. With our tenuous relationship, my friends, it will be a campaign for our lives, for the lives of our children. These problems in Jerusalem, of security in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, are just problems of our future and survival. We made great sacrifices, we dared, took great risks. Indeed, Sadat will get all the whole Sinai Peninsula. At Camp David, we never mentioned we shall remove the settlements in the northern Sinai. On the contrary, the president assumed I will speak in the Knesset against it and he asked me the question whether it was possible that I will be silent in the debate and when we had that choice, took it upon ourselves with the greatest pain in our hearts, that pain will follow me to the last day of my life because it is unjust. We did it for the sake of peace, it was also a matter of security, a matter of human beings, they do not acquiesce, they protest vehemently. We took great risks, we gave already sacrifices, but now comes the main issue. First of all, Jerusalem, is it occupied territory, the so-called Arab sector, and there should be so-called Arab sovereignty, etc., or it is one city, indivisible, and the recognized capital of the state of Israel, and then all the other arrangements concerning our sovereignty, not for five years, but for good. That was the pledge given to us. But for good. This is the decisive issue. Who is going to defend us in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip? As I said to Secretary Vance, "Do you assume that we deal with Jura?" In Switzerland, there was a territory called Jura, and for years they fought for recognition as a canton, with all the autonomy and privileges a canton possesses, and the federation didn't grant them this status for many years. So there were demonstrations. The Swiss way. Nobody got killed during those demonstrations. The Swiss way. Demonstrations. Lastly, just a few weeks ago, the federation recognized Jura as a canton, one of the cantons. And everything is quiet. Everybody's happy. It's not Jura. There they are the PLO, with the pistols, Kalashnikovs and machine guns. I told Mr. Atherton, "Those Arabs you met are threatening our lives and we have to give them our protection." I can't say that about the Arabs Mr. Saunders met, but I think it will be the same. On the first, they have information, and we keep our eye on the people who met Mr. Atherton. If we don't have there our army and our security, they will take over in no time. Then they are in mortal danger. The free world is also in danger, because it will be there a Moscow base in the heart of the Middle East. Now, Mr. Atherton spends all of the last five days in Moscow. He didn't go even to Baghdad. Instead, he went to Moscow. Everybody can understand it. But, as far as we're concerned, this is the heart of our problem: whether we should live in peace, or whether there will be permanent bloodshed. And then, as I said, we will have to call upon our president here to stand strongly. We have all the chances to win the day. Justice is on our side. A signed agreement is on our side, with a truthful interpretation of it. All the sacrifices we already gave are on our side. Of course, justice is on our side. So we will have to stand together and make it clear that the 70s are not the 40s. And in the 70s and in the 80s, the great American Jewish community and all the Jewish people will stand by Israel and make sure that Israel lives and in security and in peace, in real peace. Thank you for your attention.


I don't know how much time the prime minister has before he has to catch his plane to Los Angeles.

This plane will not wait for me.

It's not your plane. Mr. Prime Minister, we will come to see you in Israel. We will see you here again. I want to simply say that, on the issues that you mentioned, we will, indeed, stand as one in the years ahead. On Jerusalem, on the right to have a military presence in Judea and Samaria, the American Jewish community, I'm convinced, will stand as one with you, sir.


This besora, I am entitled to bring to Israel?

Yes, it's not off the record, Mr. Prime Minister.

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